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Global Competition Law Framework: A Private International 
Law Solution Needed 
Mihail Danov 
 
 
Abstract: There are a significant number of national competition law systems which prohibit 
anti-competitive behaviour. The cross-border nature of many antitrust/competition law 
infringements leaves no doubt that parallel and related competition law proceedings will arise. 
Competition laws enjoy public policy character, and as a result are regarded as mandatory 
provisions of the forum. The extra-territorial application of mandatory antitrust law provisions 
does suggest that different sets of competition laws may be applicable depending on where the 
competition law proceedings are taking place. Since there may often be a conflict of competition 
laws, there are complex issues which must be addressed in a global context. This article 
demonstrates that a private international law tool, which aims to preserve the diverse national 
competition law cultures, may be used as a new mode of governance in a global context. Such 
an instrument could/should take account of the competition laws of the countries that have 
legitimate interests to regulate the relevant business activities. Given the high costs for achieving 
harmonised competition laws in a global context, agreeing upon a private international law 
instrument with a view to coordinating cross-border competition law proceedings may be a more 
realistic objective to be pursued by the international community.  
 
Key words: Global governance, Competition law, Conflict of competition laws, Cross-border 
proceedings, Private international law 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Competition laws regulate the business activities of private undertakings1 with a view to 
deterring anti-competitive behaviour/practices.2 Recent research shows that ³>W@KHUHDUH now 
PRUH WKDQQDWLRQDO FRPSHWLWLRQ ODZ V\VWHPV´3 It is not only that competition laws are 
different, but also the competition culture across the globe is diverse. In 2013/14, the 
International Competition Network (ICN) conducted amongst its members a Competition 
Culture Survey. As a part of this project, the ICN Advocacy Working Group provided a 
definition of competition culture, and noted that: 
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 A Albors-/ORUHQV³Consumer Law, Competition Law and the Europeanization of Private Law´ in F Cafaggi 
(ed.) The Institutional Framework of European Private Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 244, 260. 
2
 See E M Fox, ³Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, and Sideways´ (2000) 75 New York 
University Law Review 1781, 1782-4.; W P J Wils, Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement (Hart Publishing, 
2005) pp 116-118; A P Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC 
Competition Law by National Courts (Hart Publishing, 2008) 7-8.  
3
 E M Fox and A Arena, ³The international institutions of competition law´ in E M Fox and M J Trebilcock (eds.), 
The Design of Competition Law Institutions: Global Norms, Local Choices (Oxford University Press, 2012) 444. 
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³each jurisdiction is situated differently with respect to public policies that promote market 
competition or cooperation. For example, transition economies and small island economies may 
be characterised by a more regulatory approach, in which there is greater state involvement in 
the running of markets and where markets are highly concentrated. It is also important to 
recognise that the objectives of promoting competition principles of efficiency and consumer 
welfare can be superseded by other public policy considerations, including social policy, public 
interest and national security. What may be considered a µVWURQJFRPSHWLWLRQFXOWXUH¶ in one 
jurisdiction may not be feasible or appropriate in another.´4  
 
It is well established that competition law provisions are intended to protect important 
public interests, and, as a result, for choice of law purposes, competition law rules are regarded 
as mandatory provisions which express the public policy of the forum.5 There is a real risk of 
conflict of competition laws.6 An effective global competition law framework which takes 
account of the diverse competition law cultures across the globe would be important with a 
view to providing for effective remedies with regard to competition law infringements that 
occur in a global context. Given the number of national competition law systems, which may 
apply to the same cross-border business activities, a choice of governance design would be 
central to setting up an effective global competition law framework.  
Setting out the rules, which provide for a level of co-ordination between different national 
regimes, is important because the national authorities might be biased in applying their own 
competition laws, reflecting their national/regional public policy. The issue of applying national 
(or regional) competition laws in a global context has been discussed by policy-makers7 and 
commentators for some time.8 Devising an effective institutional framework9 appears to be a 
complex task for national/regional policy-makers. Since the markets are not necessarily 
national (or even regional for that matter), but, on many occasions global, most competition 
                                                          
4
 ICN Advocacy Working Group, Competition Culture Project, 14th ICN Annual Conference, Sydney, 29 April±
1 May 2015 < http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1035.pdf > (accessed 26 
January 2016) p 9. 
5
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µ(FR6ZLVV¶ [1999] ECR I-3055; Case 
38/98, Renault v Maxicar, [2000] ECR I-2973. 
6
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rules?´ (2005) The World Economy 877, 883. 
7
 Communication From the Commission to the Council, Towards an International Framework of Competition 
Rules, COM(96) 284 final. See also: European Commission, XXVIth Report on Competition Policy 1996 
3XEOLVKHG LQFRQMXQFWLRQZLWK WKHµ*HQHUDO5HSRUWRQ WKH$FWLYLWLHVRI WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ ± 1996); The US 
Department of Justice - International Competition Policy Advisory Committee,  The Final Report to the Attorney 
General and Assistant Attorney General < http://www.justice.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.html (accessed 26 January 
2016). 
8
 D K Tarullo, ³Norms and institutions in global competition policy´ (2000) The American Journal of International 
Law 478; Fox, supra n 2; O Budzinski, The Governance of Global Competition: Competence Allocation in 
International Competition Policy (Edward Elgar, 2008); E M )R[ µ/LQNHG-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a 
Virtual NetZRUN¶The International Lawyer 151, 154. 
9
 E M Fox, ³Antitrust and Institutions: Design and Change´ (2010) 41 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 
473, 486. See also: D A Crane, The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement (Oxford University Press, 
2011)'6RNROµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO$QWLWUXVW,QVWLWXWLRQV¶LQA T Guzman (ed), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition 
Policy (Oxford University Press, 2011) 187. 
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law infringements have cross-border implications.10 It has been very recently submitted that 
³WUDQVQDWLRQDO QHWZRUNV RFFXS\ FHQWUH VWDJH LQ FRPSHWLWLRQ ODZ ZKLFK is attentive to (and 
suspicious of) informal alliances or spontaneous conJUXHQFHRIPDUNHWEHKDYLRXU´11 There is 
a strong case that the policy-PDNHUVVKRXOGFDUHIXOO\FRQVLGHUZKDWPRGHRI³JRYHUQDQFH´12 
should be used with a view to setting up an effective global competition law enforcement 
regime. The literature on regulation suggests that a global system, which is not characterised 
by the availability of a supranational regulatory authority, may need to rely on other modes of 
governance.13 One such mode of governance LV³KLHUDUFK\LQZKLFKVWDWHVWUDQVIHUUHJXODWRU\
authority WR GRPLQDQW VWDWHV IRU FHUWDLQ OLPLWHG SXUSRVHV´14 Another mode of international 
JRYHUQDQFH LV ³QHWZRUNV LQ ZKLFK VWDWHV SULYDWH DFWRUV RU ERWK VKDUH UHJXODWRU\ DXWKRULW\
WURXJKFRRUGLQDWHGDQG UHSHDWHG LQWHUDFWLRQV´15 Most recently, Muir-Watt and Arroyo have 
considered how private international law may have a governance function in a cross-border 
context.16  
This article demonstrates that private international law should be used as a new mode of 
governance17 which allocates jurisdiction and identifies applicable laws in disputes involving 
                                                          
10
 E.g. Case COMP/E-1/37.512 ² Vitamins, Commission Decision of 21 November 2001 relating to a proceeding 
pursuant to Art 81 of the EC Treaty and Art 53 of the EEA Agreement [2003] OJ L6/1; Case COMP/38.899 ² 
Gas Insulated Switchgear, Commission Decision of 24 January 2007 relating to a proceeding under Art 81 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community and Art 53 of the EEA Agreement, C(2006) 6762 final; 
COMP/39.309 ± LCD - Liquid Crystal Displays, Commission Decision of 8 December 2010 relating to a 
proceeding under Art 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the Agreement on 
the European Economic Area, C(2010) 8761 final.  
11
 H Muir-:DWWµ*RYHUQLQJ1HWZRUNV$*OREDO&KDOOHQJHIRU3ULYDWH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 352, 357. 
12
 ,WKDVEHHQVXEPLWWHGWKDW³7KHWHUPµJRYHUQDQFH¶LVXVHGLQUHODWLRQWRQDWLRQDO(XURSHDQDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDO
orders, and it crosses the public-SULYDWHGLYLGH>«@*RYHUQDQFH>«@HQFRPSDVVHVDOOVWDJHVRIWKHSROLF\FKDLQ
from drafting to enacting WRLPSOHPHQWLQJWRHQIRUFLQJUXOHV´0 de Visser, Network-Based Governance in EC 
Law (Hart Publishing, 2009) 4. See also: The New Modes of Governance Project ± T L Brunell, C Harlow and A 
S Sweet, Litigating the Treaty of Rome: The European Court of Justice and Articles 226, 230, and 234 < 
http://www.eu-newgov.org/datalists/deliverables_detail.asp?Project_ID=26 > (accessed 26 January 2016); K A 
Armstrong, ³7KHFKDUDFWHURI(8ODZDQGJRYHUQDQFH)URP³&RPPXQLW\PHWKRG´WRQHZPRGHVRI
governance´ (2011) Current Legal Problems 179. 
13
 M Kahler and D A Lake, ³Economic integration and global governance: Why so little supranationalism?´ in 
W Mattli and N Woods (eds), The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press 2009) 242. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 H Muir-Watt and D P F Arroyo, Private International Law and Global Governance (Oxford University Press, 
6HHDOVR%ORJ³3ULYDWH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDV*OREDO*RYHUQDQFH´http://blogs.sciences-po.fr/pilagg/ > 
(accessed 26 January 2016). H Muir-:DWWµ3ULYDWH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZEH\RQGWKH6FKLVP¶ (2011) 2 
Transnational legal theory  347; H Muir-:DWWµ,QWHJUDWLRQDQGGLYHUVLW\7KHFRQIOLFWRIODZVDVDUHJXODWRU\
WRRO¶LQ) Cafaggi (ed), The Institutional Framework of European Private Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 
p. 107; H Muir-Watt, ³European integration, legal diversity and the conflict of laws´ (2005) Edinburgh Law 
Review 6; A Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law: Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiarity 
in the International Constitutional Ordering of Private Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009); A Mills, 
³Federalism in the European Union and the United States: Subsidiarity, Private Law, and the Conflict of Laws´ 
(2010-1) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 369-455. 
17
 A-M Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press 2004) 16. 
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private undertakings that engage in anti-competitive practices in a global context. Indeed, many 
private undertakings whose business activities are regulated by competition laws are 
multinational groups of companies doing business in several jurisdictions.18 A contemporary 
world, in which multi-national companies employ business strategies that are global in nature,19 
calls for an appropriately drafted private international law instrument preserving the diverse 
national competition law cultures. Employing a private international tool as a new mode of 
governance could/should be used to co-ordinate cross-border antitrust law enforcement 
activities.20 Coordinating enforcement activities and avoiding duplication of work would be 
iPSRUWDQWIRUWKHFUHDWLRQRID³JOREDOOHJDOV\VWHP´21 which provides for effective remedies in 
cross-border competition law cases. With this in mind, an analysis of the jurisdictional issues 
and substantive law issues, in the light of the relevant case law, will be used to indicate how 
cross-border competition law enforcement activities could be co-ordinated in a global context. 
To this end, the article will open with a brief explanation as to why an effective private 
international law regime would be necessary as a part of a well-functioning global competition 
law framework. Then, the importance of jurisdictional issues arising in the context of cross-
border competition law infringements will be outlined by engaging with relevant cases. Thirdly, 
complex issues of jurisdiction arising in cases where there is a conflict of competition laws, as 
well as a level of divergence, will be duly analysed. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn 
with a view to co-ordinating cross-border competition law enforcement activities in a global 
context.  
 
B. DEVISING A GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW REGIME: A CASE FOR A PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW INSTRUMENT 
A level of harmonisation of substantive competition laws and principles has proved difficult in 
a global context. This appears to be the case despite the need for a global competition law 
regime being identified by influential bodies such as the European Commission,22 which noted: 
                                                          
18
 e.g. Vitamins, supra n 10; Gas Insulated Switchgear, supra n 10; LCD - Liquid Crystal Displays, supra n 10. 
19
 Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003, COM(2009) 206 final [22]. 
20
 The paper is timely in view of the decision of the General Affairs and Policy Council (Hague Conference) to 
FRQWLQXHZLWKWKH³-XGJPHQWV3URMHFW´6HHhttp://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2012concl_en.pdf > [16-19] 
(accessed 26 January 2016). 
21
 Slaughter, supra n 17, 85. 
22
 Communication From the Commission to the Council, Towards an International Framework of Competition 
Rules, COM(96) 284 final, 18 June 1996. See also: European Commission, XXVIth Report on Competition Policy 
1996 3XEOLVKHGLQFRQMXQFWLRQZLWKWKHµ*HQHUDO Report on the Activities of the European Union ± 1996) p. 95. 
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³The number and size of transnational firms has increased. There are more commercial practices 
that have international dimensions than ever before. These can lead to an increase in cross-border 
anti-competitive practices: cartels with international effects, agreements whose effect is to 
exclude (foreign) competitors in an unfair way, international abuses of a dominant position, or 
international mergers with anti-competitive effects. Such practices can limit competition and 
undermine the benefits of liberalisation. 
These developments call into question the domestic nature of competition rules and the absence 
of binding rules at the international level. Many countries or regions have implemented 
comprehensive competition policies, but lack appropriate instruments to apply domestic 
competition rules to anti-competitive practices with an international dimension, as well as to 
obtain relevant information outside their jurisdiction. A framework is then necessary to enhance 
HIIHFWLYHHQIRUFHPHQWRIFRPSHWLWLRQUXOHV´23  
 
The Commission proposed negotiations at WTO with a view to adopting a WTO 
instrument binding upon the states, but without direct effect. The European Commission 
justified its proposal for a global competition law regime by outlining four main reasons, which 
need to be addressed by policy-makers. First, in the absence of a legal instrument to deal with 
cross-border competition law infringements, it was felt that private restraints and anti-
competitive practices may deny access of European companies to third country markets.24 
6HFRQGO\WKH&RPPLVVLRQIHOWWKDWDOHJDOIUDPHZRUNZDVQHHGHGLQRUGHU³WRDYRLGconflicts 
RI ODZ>V@ DQG MXULVGLFWLRQ DQG WR SURPRWH D JUDGXDO FRQYHUJHQFH RI FRPSHWLWLRQ ODZV´25 
Thirdly, given the important role of competition law for the functioning of the European 
economy, a global competition law regime may be necessary with a view to ³tak[ing] account 
of the effects of globalisation´.26 Fourthly, an enhanced commitment and co-operation with 
regard to enforcement would have positive effects on the trading system as a whole.27 
In line with the Commission initiative, the WTO set up a Working Group on the 
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy.28 The 1998 Report29 of the working group 
did recommend to the General Council to continue the educative work in the area.30 The Doha 
2001 Ministerial Declaration went on to recognise the need for a multilateral framework and 
                                                          
23
 Communication From the Commission to the Council, Towards an International Framework of Competition 
Rules, COM(96) 284 final, 18 June 1996, p 3. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid, p 4. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 See Singapore First WTO Ministerial Conference - Adopted 13 December 1996, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, 18  
December 1996 [20]. See also: WTO web site << 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/comp_e/history_e.htm#singapore >> (accessed 26 January 2016). 
29
 Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the General 
Council, WT/WGTCP/2, 8 December 1998. 
30
 See also: Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Communication From the 
United States, WT/WGTCP/W/35, 1 October 1997; Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and 
Competition Policy, Submission by the European Community and its Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/45, 24 
November 1997.  
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closer cooperation in the area.31 However, the WTO General Council stated that these issues 
³will not form part of the Work Programme set out in that Declaration and therefore no work 
towards negotiations on any of these issues will take place within the WTO during the Doha 
5RXQG´32 This strongly suggests that, in practice, it may be difficult to devise a global 
competition law regime.33  
According to the global governance theory, the failure of the WTO negotiations may be 
reJDUGHGDVDQRWKHU³>H[DPSOH] of insufficient political will to regulate transnational problems 
FROOHFWLYHO\´34 One could strongly argue that the issues, which were identified by the 
Commission as requiring to set up a global competition law regime, remain relevant and may 
still need to be addressed by a private international law tool in a global context. The number 
and size of business activities with regional and global dimensions have substantially increased 
since 1996. The need to devise a framework which is necessary to govern cross-border 
competition law enforcement activities in a global context is as important as ever.  
The governance aspects of cross-border EU competition law actions and the role of 
private international law have been recently discussed in the European Union context where a 
level of harmonisation has already been achieved.35 It has been argued that the current 
enforcement regime in the EU calls for a specifically designated private international law 
mechanism which promotes inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition dispute resolution, and 
provides effective remedies for injured parties in cross-border cases. Since it is very difficult 
for the international community to set up ³DQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPSHWLWLRQDXWKRULW\ZLWKLWVRZQ
enforcement jurisdiction,´36 the policy-makers in a global context could ³VHWWKHWHUPVRIWKHLU
                                                          
31
 Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration ± Adopted on 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 
20 November 2001, [23-25]. 
32
 Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579, 2 August 
2004, p 3.  
33
 D K 7DUXOORµ&RPSHWLWLRQSROLF\IRUJOREDOPDUNHWV¶Journal of International Economic Law 445; E M 
)R[ µ&RPSHWLWLRQ /DZ DQG WKH 0LOOHQQLXP 5RXQG¶  Journal of International Economic Law 665; J 
%DVHGRZ µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO $QWLWUXVW )URP ([WUDWHUULWRULDO $SSOLFDWLRQ WR +DUPRQL]DWLRQ¶  Louisiana Law 
Review 1037; A T *X]PDQµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO$QWLWUXVWDQGWKH:727KH/HVVRQIURP,QWHOOHFWXDOSURSHUW\¶) 
43 Virginia Journal of International Law 933; P B 6WHSKDQµ$JDLQVW,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RRSHUDWLRQ¶LQ5 A Epstein 
and M S Greve (eds.), Competition Laws in Conflict: Antitrust Jurisdiction in the Global Economy (AEI Press, 
)%HFNHUµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPSHWLWLRQ/DZEHWZHHQ8QLODWHUDOLVP+RUL]RQWDOLVPDQG*OREDOLVP¶LQ6
Shao (ed.), Special Issues on International Law (Renmin University Press, 2009) pp 296 ± 341; J Malinauskaite, 
³International competition law harmonisation and the WTO: past, present and future´ in M. Andenas and C. B. 
Andersen (eds.) Theory and Practice of Harmonisation (Edward Elgar, 2011) 323, 338-351. 
34
 H Muir-:DWWµ*RYHUQLQJ1HWZRUNV$*OREDO&KDOOHQJHIRU3ULYDWH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 352, 369. 
35
 M Danov and F Becker, ³Governance Aspects of Cross-Border EU Competition Law Actions: Theoretical and 
Practical Challenges´ (2014) Journal of Private International Law 359.  See more generally: Armstrong, supra n 
12, 182. 
36
 Compare: Basedow, supra  n 33, 1051. 
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interaction through [private international law] rules that assign jurisdiction (based on some 
criteria) to one or more states.´37  
Nonetheless, it should be noted that a level of harmonisation of competition laws may be 
justified by the fact that markets are global and as a result there may be a need to avoid 
irreconcilable national views on the anti-competitive nature of the very same global business 
activities/strategies. If there was no harmonisation, then there would be legal uncertainty which 
may increase the transaction costs for the businesses in a global context. The harm to consumers 
may be significant in so far as the businesses would pass the higher transaction costs on to the 
consumers across the globe.38 Moreover, it has been submitted that ³LQ D ZRUOG ZLWK
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws, the most restrictive antitrust laws will govern 
business behaviour.´39 A number of aspects justifying setting up a global competition law 
framework have been discussed by commentators.40 Basedow41 has argued that ³>W@KH
international harmonisation of competition laws appears desirable for various reasons. Among 
the foremost objectives is the need to cure deficits in the enforcement of national competition 
ODZV´42 
That said, Basedow himself QRWHV WKDW ³>KDUPRQLVDWLRQ@ FDQQRW EH H[SHFWHG to be 
achieved in one go, but only step by step.´43 The point has been clearly made by Guzman44 who 
reinforces the argument that, due to the high costs, a global optimal competition policy would 
be difficult to agree upon.45 In other words, a harmonised regime may be hard to achieve in so 
far as ³VWDWHVHQJDJHGLQVLJQLILFDQW LQWHUQDWLRQDO WUDGHKDYHLQFHQWLYHVWRDGRSWFRPSHWLtion 
laws that fail to maximize global welfare,´46 whilst import-oriented countries may have 
incentives to adopt stricter competition laws which are applied/enforced globally.47 As a result, 
there are low harmonisation prospects in the area of antitrust law on a global scale.48 Indeed, 
                                                          
37
 A T Guzman, ³The case for international antitrust´ in R A Epstein and M S Greve (eds,) Competition Laws in 
Conflict: Antitrust Jurisdiction in the Global Economy (AEI Press, 2004) 99, 116. 
38
 Compare: Case C-12/11, Denise McDonagh v Ryanair, ECLI:EU:C:2012:161 ± AG Bot Opinion [58] 22 
March 2012. 
39
 J O McGinnis, ³The political economy of international antitrust harmonization´ in R A Epstein and M. S. Greve 
(eds,) Competition Laws in Conflict: Antitrust Jurisdiction in the Global Economy (AEI Press, 2004) 126, 127. 
40
 Tarullo, supra n 8; Fox, supra n 2; Budzinski, supra n 8; Fox, supra n 8, 151; Malinauskaite, supra n 33, 344-
346; A Ezrachi, ³6HWWLQJWKHVFHQHWKHVFRSHDQGOLPLWVRIµLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPSHWLWLRQODZ´ in A. Ezrachi (ed.), 
Research Handbook on International Competition Law (Edward Elgar, 2012) 3, 4-13. 
41
 E.g. Basedow, supra  n 33.  
42
 Ibid, 1048. 
43
 Ibid 1050. See also: Malinauskaite, supra n 33, 344, 346-351. 
44
 Guzman, supra n 37. 
45
 Guzman, supra n 37, 110. 
46
 Stephan, supra  n 33, 75. 
47
 Guzman, supra  n 33, 946. See also: Malinauskaite, supra n 33, 350-351 
48
 Crane, supra n 9, 239-40. See also: Malinauskaite, supra n 33, 350-351 
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devising an effective institutional framework could be difficult to achieve in a global context.49 
,WKDVEHHQVXEPLWWHGWKDWDQ\JOREDOFRPSHWLWLRQODZIUDPHZRUNVKRXOG³EHEXLOWXSRQQDWLRQDO
regulatory systems, certainly for fRUHVHHDEOHIXWXUH´50 That said, on the one hand, a case against 
greater international cooperation has been made by Stephan who has stated: 
³Three reasons occur to me why, in a contemporary world, international implementation of 
competition law is limited and weak: The present international system lacks the institutional 
capacity to implement real cooperation; cooperation requires difficult political choices, not 
merely technical competences; and there is no consensus about the object of cooperation across 
a broad range of economic sectors´51 
 
On the other hand, it has been argued that a level of cooperation should be promoted.52 It 
KDVEHHQQRWHG WKDW³>W@KHUHDUH WKUHH IRUPVRI FRRSHUDWLRQ WKDWFRXOGEH LPSOHPHQWHGZLWK
regard to competition policy ± information sharing, agreement on choice of law, and 
FRRSHUDWLRQ LQ WHUPVRI VXEVWDQWLYH UXOHV´53 Given that competition law provisions express 
important and legitimate public policy interests of diverse national legal regimes, a private 
international law tool may need to be used to coordinate cross-border competition law 
proceedings. The ³FRQIOLFWRIODZVSURYLGHVDSRWHQWLDOO\XVHIXOIUDPHZRUNIRUYLHZLQJGLVSXWHV
DPRQJ PXOWLSOH QRUPDWLYH RUGHUV´54 The point may be strengthened further by making 
reference to the recent literature on global law55 which indicates that private international law 
could EHXVHGDVDPRGHRIJRYHUQDQFHLQUHVSHFWRI³LQFUHDVLQJO\GHQVHDQGLQWULFDWHUHODWLRQV
EHWZHHQ GLIIHUHQW UHJXODWRU\ UHJLPHV´56 Therefore, a private international law instrument 
should be used to govern competition law proceedings in a global context. 
Some may argue that an alternative to private international law would be to further 
promote a level of co-operation through the International Competition Network (ICN), which 
was founded in 2001.57 In a recent analysis of the ICN work, Fox and Arena have made the 
following observations: 
³7KH,&1QRZPRUHWKDQWHQ\HDUVROGLVQRUPDOO\UHJDUGHGDVDVXFFHVVLQPRYLQJODZDQG
process towards convergence. Its success is in large part attributed to the fact that it is comprised 
of the competition law community, not the trade community, and that, since it has no formal 
powers, little seems to be at stake in agreeing to (for example) recommended practices or 
                                                          
49
 Crane, supra n 9, 237. 
50
 Tarullo, supra n 30, 455. 
51
 P B Stephan, ³The problem with cooperation´ in A T Guzman (ed), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition 
Policy (Oxford University Press, 2011) 217, 218. 
52
 $*X]PDQµ&RPSHWLWLRQODZDQGFRRSHUDWLRQSRVVLEOHVWUDWHJLHV¶LQ$7*X]PDQHGCooperation, Comity, 
and Competition Policy (Oxford University Press, 2011) 345. 
53
 Ibid 356. 
54
 P S Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders (Cambridge University Press, 
2012) 192. 
55
 N Walker, Intimations of Global Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 107 ± 114. 
56
 Ibid pp 108-109. See also: Muir-Watt, supra n 16; J Bonhoff and A 0HXZHVHµ7KH0HWD-regulation of 
Transnational Private Regulation¶Journal of Law and Society 138. 
57
 See more: Fox and Arena, supra n 3, 481-4. 
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principles. 0RUHRYHUEHFDXVHWKHDJHQFLHV¶DJUHHPHQWVLQ,&1GRQRWELQGWKHLUJRYHUQPHQWV, 
no higher governmental organization is needed, thus facilitating agreement.´58 
 
That said, there is a view WKDW³>W@KLVIRUPRIVRIWFRRSHUDWLRQIXUWKHUVWKHHQIRUFHPHQW
goals of regulators but does virtually nothing to address the over- and underregulation of 
antitrust law at internationDO OHYHO´59 Indeed, national competition authorities, which would 
exclusively apply their national (or regional) competition laws, may be less than adequate 
competition law enforcers in a global context in VRIDUDVDQRWKHUFRXQWU\¶VODZVPD\QHHGWR
be applied if the country in question has legitimate interests to have its laws applicable.60 A 
case for using a new mode of global governance can be strengthened by noting that ³DOO
institutions contain some policy bias.61 The greater the policy bias of a national institution, the 
more biased will be any new form of global governance created by that institution.´62 
Moreover, the global nature of the trade nowadays strongly suggests that more of the 
competition law infringements would cause harm to consumers and businesses in several 
jurisdictions.63 7KHUHZRXOGEHVSHFLILFSUREOHPVLQWKH³GHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVZKLFKDOPRVW
by definition do not have the resources to catch and deter violations that originate below their 
borders.´64 In other words, the inability of some national institutions to adequately enforce their 
competition laws would leave an enforcement gap which may be seen as another indication that 
there is a need for ³DQDOWHUQDWLYHIRUPRIJRYHUQDQFH´65 to be considered in the area. 
Furthermore, in 2013, the ICN and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) conducted a survey among national competition authorities.66 The 
survey results reiterated the benefits of the co-operation among national competition 
authorities,67 but the RYHUDOO FRQFOXVLRQ DSSHDUV WR EH WKDW WKH ³>L@ncentives to co-operation 
depend on the effectiveness of the international enforcement system. Reforms of the legal and 
institutional setting for international co-operation can increase incentives for agencies to engage 
                                                          
58
 Fox and Arena, supra n 3, 482-3. 
59
 Guzman, supra n 34, 116. 
60
 A T YRQ0HKUHQµ6SHFLDOVXEVWDQWLYHUXOHVIRUPXOWLVWDWHSUREOHPV7KHLUUROHDQGVLJQLILFDQFHLQ
contemporary choice of law mHWKRGRORJ\¶Harvard Law Review 347, 351. 
61
 55RJRZVN\µ,QVWLWXWLRQVDVFRQVWUDLQWV RQVWUDWHJLFFKRLFH¶LQ' A Lake and R Powell (eds), Strategic 
Choice and International Relations (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1999). 
62
 M Kahler and D A /DNHµ(FRQRPLFLQWHJUDWLRQDQGJOREDOJRYHUQDQFH:K\VROLWWOHVXSUDQDWLRQDOLVP"¶LQ
Mattli and N Woods (eds), The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2009) 242, 
255 ± emphasis in the original, 
63
 Tarullo, supra n 8, 481-2; E M )R[µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO$QWLWUXVWDQGWKH'RKD'RPH¶Virginia Journal of 
International Law 911. 
64
 Fox, supra n 8, 154. 
65
 K W Abbott and D 6QLGDOµ7KHJRYHUQDQFHWULDQJOH5HJXODWRU\standards institutions and the shadow of the 
state¶LQW. Mattli and N Woods (eds), The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press, 2009) 44. 
66
 OECD/ICN Survey on International Competition Enforcement Co-operation, 2013 < 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/InternEnforcementCooperation2013.pdf > (accessed 26 January 2016). 
67
 Ibid, p 10. 
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more effectively in case cooperation.´68 The need for new forms of co-operation among the 
States has been identified by the 2014 OECD Report on the Challenges of international co-
operation in competition law enforcement.69 Its conclusion states that: 
³Continuing and deepening the existing system of bilateral co-operation is important. However, 
making it work going forward will be increasingly complex, as business becomes more 
globalised, spanning more jurisdictions enforcing competition law. Governments may want to 
consider whether new approaches to international co-operation in enforcing competition law are 
required, in the face of this challenge. These might include, for instance, developing general 
standards designed to promote both convergence in substance and procedure as well as greater 
co-operation and co-ordination that could be applied in the context of differing national legal 
systems around the world.´70 
 
ThHDXWKRU¶VYLHZLVWKDWJLYHQWKe diverse legal traditions and competition law cultures 
across the globe, the effectiveness of international enforcement system would presuppose an 
effectively functioning judicial system (or rather effective functioning national judicial 
systems) which could provide effective remedies in a global context. 71 Indeed, it is difficult to 
see how the ICN could be used to avoid parallel competition law proceedings, resulting in 
duplication of work, (public and private spending) costs, ineffectiveness and inefficiencies. For 
example, national competition authorities (which are administrative bodies combining the 
function of a party to competition law proceedings and a judge in Europe72) and national courts 
(located in a non-EU country) may both have the powers to apply competition law provisions 
in individual cases73 related to the same infringement. However, a national competition 
DXWKRULW\¶VGHFLVLRQ may have no binding effect outside the territory on which the authority in 
question operates.74 Indeed, the cross-border nature of the business activities appears to suggest 
that there is a strong case that a new mode of governance based on private international law,75 
which provides for co-operation between the various competition law systems, should be used 
to address issues of competence allocation and applicable competition laws in a global context. 
Indeed, private international law instruments are often seen as appropriate legislative tools, 
which may be used to preserve the inherent characteristics of the diverse competition law 
                                                          
68
 Ibid. 22 
69
 OECD Report on the Challenges of international co-operation in competition law enforcement (2014).< 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/challenges-international-coop-competition-2014.htm > (accessed 26 
January 2016). 
70
 Ibid, 54. 
71
 A M Mateus, ³Competition and Development: Towards an Institutional Foundation for Competition 
Enforcement´ (2010) World Competition 275, 296. See also: S Djankov, R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes and A 
6KOHLIHUµ&RXUWV¶Quarterly Journal of Economics 453. 
72
 Wils, supra n 2, 88; Komninos, supra n 2, 119. 
73
 Compare: Arts 5 and 6 ± Regulation 1/2003. 
74
 White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, Commission 
Programme 99/027 [60]. See Wils, supra n 2, 116-18; Komninos, supra n 2, 77; S Brammer, Co-operation between 
National Competition Agencies in the Enforcement of EC Competition Law (Hart Publishing, 2009) 426±436. 
75
 Guzman, supra n 34, 116. 
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cultures.76 However, the use of a private international law solution in a global context has been 
questioned by Guzman77 who notes that:  
³choice-of-law rules cannot, without more, address the problems of over- and underregulation. 
A choice-of-law system that allows for overlapping jurisdiction leaves the problem of 
overregulation unresolved. A system that assigns jurisdiction to a single state can reduce the 
problem of overregulation but may exacerbate the problem of underegulation. Nor can a choice-
of-law strategy prevent local favouritism and trade-induced distortions of national substantive 
SROLFLHV´78  
 
With this in mind, the author argues that jurisdictional issues would be central in a global 
context. The issues of jurisdiction and applicable competition laws are best to be addressed 
through a private international law instrument. This argument will be substantiated by 
examining some of the cases which have arisen in a global context. 
C. JURISDICTION AND CROSS-BORDER CASES 
The concept of jurisdiction, when used in the context of cross-border competition law 
LQIULQJHPHQWV PD\ KDYH SXEOLF LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ FRQQRWDWLRQV LH ³MXULVGLFWLRQ WR
SUHVFULEH´79) and private international law nuances (i.e. jurisdiction to adjudicate80). The former 
concept which is ³also called legislative or regulatory jurisdiction, is designed to explore the 
H[WHQWDQGOLPLWVRIWKHUHDFKRIDQDWLRQ¶VODZV´81 In a private international law context, it has 
been noted WKDW³>M@XULVGLFWLRQLQYROYHVWKHGHFLVLRQRIDFRPPXQLW\WRDVVHUWOHJDOGRPLQLRQ
RYHUDQDFWRUDFWRU´82 The academic literature goes further to highlight the political dimension 
of jurisdiction83 which may need to be factored in when competition law enforcement is co-
ordinated (or governed) globally. It has been very recently submitted that:  
³Jurisdiction has always been more than the infrastructure of the judicial order or part of the 
configuration of legal authority. It is the very extension of the state power in the form of legal 
authority; it is how legal authority gets done ± how it is extended, reconceived and abbreviated. 
                                                          
76
 Muir-Watt, ³European integration supra n16, 7. See also: Muir-Watt, ³Integration and diversity´supra n 16; . 
7LFK\µ$QHZUROHIRUSULYDWHLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZDQGSURFHGXUDOODZLQ(XURSHDQ,QWHJUDWLRQ"$FULWLFDO
FRPPHQW¶LQ5 Brownsword, H.-W Micklitz, L Niglia and S Weatherill (eds.), The Foundations of European 
Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2011) 393 ± 412; Mills, supra n 16; D Lasok and P A Stone, Conflict of Laws in 
the European Community (Professional Books Limited, 1987) 144 ± 145. 
77
 Guzman, supra n 37. 
78
 Ibid 116-7. 
79
 A F Lowenfeld, International Litigation and Arbitration  (2nd edn, West Group, 2002) 39. J Adolphsen, µ7KH
conflict of laws in cartel matters in a globalised world: Alternatives to the HIIHFWVGRFWULQH¶Journal of 
Private International Law 151, 155. 
80
 A T von Mehren and D T Trautman, ³A Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis´ (1966) Harvard 
Law Review 1121. 
81
 Lowenfeld, supra n 79, 39. See also: Adolphsen, supra n 79, 155.  
82
 Berman, supra n 54, 191. 
83
 A Kaushal, ³The Politics of Jurisdiction´ (2015) 78 Modern Law Review 759-792. 
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This makes jurisdiction a conceptual powerhouse with the capacity to remake legal categories. 
Conceived properly, jurisdiction is the political heart of the judicial order.´84 
  
There is a strong case that the concept of adjudicatory jurisdiction may be very important 
with a view to co-ordinating enforcement activities in competition cases in a global context. Its 
relevance may be illustrated by reference to Nokia v AU Optronics Corporation.85 In this case, 
Nokia brought a competition claim against 25 defendants in England. It was alleged that 
manufacturers of LCDs KDGDJUHHGWR³IL[WKHSULFHVDQGOLPLWWKHVXSSO\RI/&'VVROGLQ the 
JOREDOPDUNHW>«@´86 The behaviour of the defendants has been subject to investigation not 
only by the European Commission and the US Department of Justice, but also by national 
competition authorities in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Canada.87 Moreover, a private 
antitrust claimant may have a level of freedom in choosing where to bring a claim.88 Therefore, 
the issue of parallel proceedings, which may lead to irreconcilable findings/decisions, is bound 
to arise. Furthermore, there could be numerous differences in the laws of the available forums, 
which could lead to advantages for sophisticated claimants that are in a position to make an 
informed decision where to conduct a trial with a view to benefitting from the relevant rules (eg 
pre-trial discovery; costs (eg the availability of contingency fees); and opt-out collective redress 
proceedings; the availability of multiple damages (or punitive) damages which could often 
depend on the lex fori).89  
The following questions are bound to arise: What are the difficulties when allocating 
jurisdiction in a global context?90 Is there room for the notion of territoriality when regulating 
global business activities? Should it be possible for competition laws of one legal system to 
prescribe the behaviour of companies based in another country? May another country¶VODZVEH
applied if the latter has legitimate interests to have its laws applicable in so far as the business 
activities in question may affect the process of competition and consumer welfare there?  
                                                          
84
 Ibid 788. 
85
 Nokia Corporation v AU Optronics Corporation & Others [2012] EWHC 731 (Ch). 
86
 See the Particulars of the Claim [45] quoted in Nokia, supra n 85, [39]. 
87
 See the Particulars of the Claim [47] quoted in Nokia, supra n 85, [39] 
88
 See Cooper Tire & Rubber Company v Shell Chemicals UK Limited [2009] EWHC 2609 (Comm); Cooper 
Tire & Rubber Company Europe Limited & Others [2010] EWCA Civ 864. 
89
 M Danov, Jurisdiction and Judgments in Relation to EU Competition Law Claims (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2010) Ch 5; and M Danov, F Becker and P Beaumont (eds.), Cross-Border EU Competition Law Actions (Hart 
Publishing, 2013). 
90
 The issues have been discussed in the European context. See Danov, supra n 89. See also: J Basedow, S 
Francq and L Idot (eds), International Antitrust Litigation: Conflict of Laws and Coordination (Hart Publishing, 
2012). 
 13 
 
1. Jurisdiction to Prescribe 
The concept of jurisdiction to prescribe/regulate does suggest which set of competition laws 
should be used to determine whether there is a competition law infringement. In practice, this 
may be far from a straightforward process because several states may have legitimate interests 
for their laws to regulate cross-border business activities. On the one hand, the question as to 
which set of laws would apply to the merits of a competition law dispute denotes a choice-of-
law problem in so far as such a dispute may essentially be regarded as a commercial dispute.91  
On the other hand, national competition authorities, which have the status of public 
administrative bodies, may be involved in such disputes, so that they may often impose 
administrative penalties (i.e. fines) on undertakings (e.g. multinational groups of companies) 
that have infringed competition laws.  
The problems, which arise in this context, can be demonstrated by making reference to 
Imperial Chemical Industries.92 In this case, the parties to a dispute before the English court 
were two English companies. The questions were: Should the English court enforce a contract 
without taking account of the US antitrust laws? Are the legitimate interests of applying the US 
laws to be taken account of in this context? The English court performed a private international 
law analysis when addressing the issues by holding that: 
³[this is] an English contract made between English nationals and to be performed in England, 
to have it performed and, if necessary, to have an order made by the courts of this country for its 
specific performance. That is a right - it might be said, a species of property, seeing particularly 
that it is related to patents - which is English in character and is subject to the jurisdiction of the 
English courts; and it seems to me that the plaintiffs have at least established a prima facie case 
for saying that it is not competent for the courts of the United States or of any other country to 
interfere with those rights or to make orders, observance of which by our courts would require 
that our courts should not exercise the jurisdiction which they have and which it is their duty to 
exercise in regard to those rights.´93 
 
That said, adopting a more sophisticated private international law solution may be needed 
in a global context. There should be a possibility for a national court to consider the 
compatibility of business activities with the laws of another country which may have legitimate 
interests to have its laws applicable in cases where the infringers¶conduct affects the process 
of competition and consumer welfare there.  
                                                          
91
 Eg Art 6 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on 
the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ L199/40. 
92
 United States v Imperial Chemical Industries 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States v Imperial 
Chemical Industries 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952; British Nylon Spinners v Imperial Chemical Industries 
[1953] Ch 19 (CA); British Nylon Spinners v Imperial Chemical Industries [1955] 1 Ch 37. See also: Lowenfeld, 
supra n 79, 39-59. 
93
 British Nylon Spinners v Imperial Chemical Industries [1953] Ch 19, 26.  
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2. Extra-territoriality and Comity 
,WLVQRZZHOOHVWDEOLVKHGWKDW³WKHUHLVQRURRPIRUWKHQRWLRQRIWHUULWRULDOLW\LQWKHFRQIOLFWRf 
laws which, on the contrary, permits and requires the application of whatever foreign law, 
VWDWXWRU\RUFRPPRQSXEOLFRUSULYDWHLWVFRQVWLWXHQWUXOHVUHIHUWR´94 Collins has noted that 
³>F@RPLW\PD\EHDGLVFUHGLWHGFRQFHSWLQWKHH\HVRIWKHWH[WZULWers, but it thrives in the judicial 
GHFLVLRQV´95 which indicates that the issue should be carefully considered along with the 
concept of extra-territorial application of competition law provisions. 
The extra-territorial application of competition laws has been widely discussed by the 
courts96 and commentators.97 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU may be applied extra-territorially. 
This was clearly established by the Court of Justice in Wood Pulp.98 The extra-territorial 
application of EU competition laws can be further deduced from the decisions in the 
Gencor/Lonrho99 and GE/Honeywell100 cases.101 Similarly, the US Sherman Act has been 
applied to extra-territorial conduct.102 The extra-territorial application of competition law 
provisions may be legitimately justified in so far as behaviour of undertakings based in one 
jurisdiction may often adversely affect the trade (and the process of competition as well as 
FRQVXPHUV¶ZHOIDUHLQDQRWKHUMXULVGLFWLRQ.103  
                                                          
94
 F A Mann, Conflict of Laws and Public Law, Recueil Des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law (A. W. Sijtoff, 1971) 107, 190. 
95
 L &ROOLQVµ&RPLW\LQPRGHUQSULYDWHLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶LQ- J Fawcett (ed.) Reform and Development of 
Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 2002) 89, 95. 
96
 The EU approach: Joined Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116±17/85, and 125±29/85 Ahlstrom v Commission 
[1988] ECR 5193 (Wood Pulp Cartel Case). Compare the US approach: (a) territorial approach: America 
Banana v United Fruit 86EWKHµHIIHFWV¶DSSURDFKUnited States v Aluminum Co of America 
(Alcoa) )GG&LUFWKHµEDODQFLQJ¶DSSURDFKTimberline Lumber v Bank of America 549 F 
2d 597 (9th Cir 1976). See also Restatement of the Law (Third), The Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
(1987) [403]. 
97
  M Waelbroeck, ³The European Community Approach´ in C J Omstead (ed) Extra-territorial Application of 
Laws and Responses Thereto (International Law Association in association with ESC Publishing Limited, 1984) 
74; V Pavic, Extra-territoriality in the Matters of Antitrust (European Press Academic Publishing, 2001); W S 
'RGJHµ([WUDWHUULWRULDOLW\DQG&RQIOLFW-of-/DZV7KHRU\$QDUJXPHQWIRUMXGLFLDOXQLODWHUDOLVP¶ 
Harvard International Law Journal 101; Adolphsen, supra n 79; A Jones and B Sufrin, EU Competition Law: 
Text, Cases and Materials (5th ed., Oxford University Press, 2014) 1271±86. 
98
 Wood Pulp, supra n 96. 
99
 Case T-102/96 Gencor Ltd v Commission [1999] ECR II-753. See also Case No IV/M.619 Gencor/Lonrho 
[1997] OJ L11/30. 
100
 Case T-210/01 General Electric v Commission [2005] ECR II-5575. 
101
 Jones and Sufrin, supra n 97, 1279±86. See also: E M Fox, ³The Merger Regulation and its territorial reach´ 
(1999) European Competition Law Review 334. 
102
 E.g Timberline Lumber Co v Bank of America, NT & SA 549 F2d 597 at 609 (9th Cir 1976).  
103
 Fox, supra n 8, 154; F W Papp, ³Competition law and extraterritoriality´ in A Ezrachi (ed.), Research 
Handbook on International Competition Law (Edward Elgar, 2012) 21, 22. 
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However, competition laws do enjoy public policy character,104 and as a result they are 
often regarded as mandatory rules for private international law purposes.105 The law of the 
forum may have an important role to play in this context. Extra-territorial application of 
mandatory rules of the forum may be problematic as different regulations may be applicable to 
a given legal relationship in different countries.106 The extra-territorial application of mandatory 
antitrust law provisions would fly in the face of the ³so-called categorical imperative of [private 
international law which] implies that legal systems of all States are of equal value and deserve 
the same appreciation.´107 This poses an interesting question about the conflict of mandatory 
competition laws.  
As noted elsewhere,108 if the applicable set of competition laws does not guarantee that 
the dispute is sufficiently closely connected with the forum, then an English court, for example, 
would always need to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU as being mandatory rules of the forum. 
,QRWKHUZRUGVLIDQDJUHHPHQWZHUHµLPSOHPHQWHG¶ZLWKLQWKH(8DQG the competition law 
infringement had appreciable effect on competition or inter-state trade within the EU, then an 
English court could not refuse to apply EU competition law, even if the competition law 
infringement was manifestly more closely connected with the US (or the US antitrust law had 
a stronger claim to be applied).109 It would have been more appropriate if the policy-makers 
had provided for a private international law solution in a global context, which would have 
guaranteed that a set of competition laws would not be applicable unless the dispute is 
sufficiently closely connected with the forum.110  
The problems might be exacerbated by the adoption of legislative instruments which may 
limit the application of foreign antitrust laws affecting domestic trading interests.111 This point 
is illustrated by the Laker Airways litigation, which suggests that various national public 
policies may be at stake before English112 and American113 judges in such cases. In this case, 
an important issue was whether LWLV³DSSURSULDWHLQWKHLQWHUHVWVRIDYRLGLQJLQMXVWLFHWRHQMRLQ
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 Eco Swiss, supra n 5. Renault, supra n 5. 
105
 See Danov, supra n 89, Ch 5. 
106
 See C M Schmitthoff, The English Conflict of Laws  (3rd edn, Steven & Sons, 1954) 11. 
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 T Pfeiffer, Private International Law in R Wofrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (Volume VIII, Oxford University Press, 2012) 459, 464. 
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109
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Lakers from pursuing their claims against B$DQG%&LQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVFRXUWV´114 The 
English Court of Appeal answered this question in affirmative and granted an anti-suit 
injunction. The effect of the Protection of Trading Interests (U.S. Antitrust Measures) Order 
1983 was decisive.115 In this FRQWH[WLWZDVVWDWHGWKDWWKHODWWHUPHDVXUH³SUHYHQWV%$DQG
B.C. complying with any judgment of the district court, in so far as it is given pursuant to the 
6KHUPDQDQG&OD\WRQ$FWV´116 However, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
CiUFXLWKHOGWKHYLHZWKDWWKHLQMXQFWLRQZDV³SXUHO\RIIHQVLYH´117 LQVRIDUDVLW³VHHNVWR quash 
the practical power of the United States courts to adjudicate claims under United States law 
DJDLQVWGHIHQGDQWVDGPLWWHGO\VXEMHFWWRWKHFRXUWV¶DGMXGLFDWRU\MXULVGLFWLRQ´ 118 The US court 
held that: 
³At the root of the conflict are the fundamentally opposed policies of the United States and Great 
Britain regarding the desirability, scope, and implementation of legislation controlling 
anticompetitive and restrictive business practices.´119 
 
The difficult issues which relate to the extra-territorial application of competition laws 
may be further illustrated by making reference to Hartford Fire Insurance.120 In this case, the 
US Supreme Court held there was not a true conflict between the US and UK law since the 
latter did not require the London-based insurers to perform activities which were prohibited by 
the law of the United States, so that it was still possible for them to comply with the Sherman 
Act.121 The foregoing examples strongly suggest that, due to the conflicting public policies at 
stake, the issue of jurisdiction to adjudicate may be very important in competition law cases in 
a global context. One should pose the question: Is there a case for linking the assumption of 
jurisdiction with the applicable substantive competition law/s122 which are to be applied in 
global competition law cases? 
The importance of allocating jurisdiction to an appropriate court could be demonstrated 
by making reference to the Vitamin case where ³HDFKFDUWHOZDVJOREDOLQQDWXUHWKHREMHFW of 
each was, inter alia, to allocate markets on a worldwide level, and thus to withhold competitive 
UHVHUYHVIURPWKH(($PDUNHW´123 In follow-on proceedings before the US District Court for 
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the District of Columbia,124 foreign purchasers125 of vitamins brought a damages action in 
connection with vitamins purchased for delivery outside of the United States against members 
of Vitamin cartels. Although the action was dismissed due to lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction,126 the FRXUWZHQWRQWRFRQVLGHUWKHFODLPDQWV¶DUJXPHQW that the US courts should 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over foreign claims with a view to avoiding parallel and 
related proceedings with respect to the same cartel agreement pending before numerous 
courts.127 In this context, Hogan J held that: 
³there are comity and efficiency reasons for declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
the foreign law claims in this case, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over plaintiffs' foreign law claims.´128 
 
However, an appeal was made before the Court of Appeals which reversed the first 
LQVWDQFHFRXUW¶VUXOLQJRQWKHVXEMHFWPDWWHUMXULVGLFWLRQ and went on to hold that the District 
Court must consider anew whether to accept supplemental jurisdiction.129 The case reached the 
US Supreme Court which adopted a different DSSURDFKZKLFKOLQNVWKHFRXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQZLWK
WKHHIIHFWVRQFRPSHWLWLRQZLWKLQDFRXQWU\¶VWHUULWRU\130 Therefore, the US court held it has no 
subject matter jurisdiction in a case where the anti-competitive price-fixing activity was in 
VLJQLILFDQWSDUWIRUHLJQ,QWKLVFDVHWKHFRXUWZHQWIXUWKHUDQGKHOGµZK\VKRXOG$PHULFDQ
ODZVXSSODQWIRUH[DPSOH&DQDGD¶VRU*UHDW%ULWDLQ¶VRU-DSDQ¶VRZQGHtermination about how 
best to protect Canadian or British or Japanese customers from anticompetitive conduct 
HQJDJHGLQVLJQLILFDQWSDUWE\&DQDGLDQRU%ULWLVKRU-DSDQHVHRURWKHUIRUHLJQFRPSDQLHV"¶131 
The judgment has been interpreted as an indication that the U.S. ³Supreme Court is receptive 
to comity when presented as a tool for statutory construction.´132 However, more importantly 
for the purposes of this paper, it may be argued that there is a strong case that a regime on 
jurisdiction may be used as an appropriate PIL mode of governance which allocates jurisdiction 
in competition law cases in a global context. This would be particularly important because such 
cross-border competition law infringements will be affecting the process of competition and 
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consumer welfare in a number of jurisdictions. The Vitamins case may indeed be regarded as 
an example which indicates that the dispute may be allocated to an appropriate court in some 
cases where the allocation of jurisdiction is linked to the applicable substantive competition 
law/s. 
The deduction that it is vitally important to initiate/consolidate proceeding before an 
appropriate forum can be further strengthened by the Transportation Surcharge Antitrust 
Litigation133 case in which claims of both US and UK victims arising from a global price-fixing 
conspiracy were settled before the US District Court for the Northern District of California.    
D. A CONFLICT OF COMPETITION LAWS: ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED IN A GLOBAL 
CONTEXT 
Even more complex jurisdictional issues may arise in cases where there is a conflict of 
mandatory competition laws. In theory, ³>F@KRLFH-of-law analysis considers which 
FRPPXQLW\¶V OHJDO QRUPV VKRXOG DSSO\ WR D GLVSXWH LQYROYLQJ PHPEHUV RI PXOWLSOH
FRPPXQLWLHV´134 That said, the various national competition law systems may pursue different 
interests in so far as there could be a difference between promoting national welfare, on the one 
hand, and enhancing global welfare, on the other hand.135 If substantive competition law 
provisions differ, then the outcome of a competition law dispute would depend on where the 
proceedings are initiated. For example, in Wood Pulp, the US Webb-Pomerene Act did exempt 
the export cartel agreements from the prohibitions laid down in the US antitrust laws.136 As a 
result, it was essential for the Commission to establish that EU competition laws applied and 
regulated WKHSULYDWHXQGHUWDNLQJV¶EHKDYLRXU6LPLODUO\LWZDVFUXFLDOIRUWKHOLWLJDQWVLQLaker 
Airways137 and Hartford Fire Insurance138 to establish jurisdiction in the US with a view to 
having US antitrust laws applied to the merits of their competition law dispute. 
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The point could be further illustrated by making reference to two sets of competition law 
proceedings, involving Virgin Airways (Virgin) and British Airways (BA) in the US139 and the 
EU.140  In July 1993, Virgin lodged a complaint with the European Commission, directed in 
particular against the marketing agreements which enabled certain agents to receive payments 
in addition to the basic commission.141 Another complaint was filed by Virgin in the Southern 
District of New York.142 In the first set of proceedings, the Commission decided to take the 
complaint up, and initiate proceedings. In July 1999, the Commission rendered a decision 
finding an infringement of EU competition law.143 However, a different view was held by the 
courts in the US. In October 1999, the District Court granted a summary judgment to British 
Airways on the ground that there was not sufficient evidence that BA engaged in anti-
competitive practices.144 The Virgin/BA competition law disputes not only show that there may 
be irreconcilable views with regard to the same type of business activities, but also that the 
proceedings may be time consuming and costly due to the level of uncertainty in a global 
context.  
Therefore, there is a strong case that establishing jurisdiction in one country rather than 
another may be very important in cases where there is a conflict of competition laws. The issues 
are indeed important because, as already noted, there may often be a conflict of competition 
laws in a global context in so far as the regional/national competition law policy objectives may 
vary145 and competition law rules themselves may differ.146 Elhauge and Geradin147 have 
recently made the following observation: 
³$OWKRXJK>«@86DQG(8GRFWULQH>LHVHWVRIFRPSHWLWLRQ ODZUXOHV@DUHFORVHU WKDQ WKH\
might appear and probably converging over time, there remain important differences. Those 
differences include divergent rules on: (1) excessive unilateral pricing; (2) above-cost predatory 
pricing; (3) a recoupment requirement for below-cost predatory pricing; (4) unilateral duties to 
deal; ([5]) loyalty and volume-based discounts; ([6]) vertical territorial restraints; and ([7]) 
vertical and conglomerate mergers. Moreover, even when the doctrines do not differ, their 
application can lead to conflicting conclusions if the courts or agencies in the U.S. and EU differ 
in their assessment of the facts of particular cases or how the law applies to those facts. And even 
ZKHQWKH86DQG(8DJUHHRWKHUDIIHFWHGQDWLRQVPD\QRW´148 
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In addition, a level of divergence exists with regard to such important issues as the 
appropriate remedies,149 standing to sue,150 passing-on defence,151 and collective redress 
mechanisms152 which are important for adequately pursuing enforcement objectives in a global 
context. Therefore, there is a strong case that different views on the anti-competitive nature of 
the conduct may be shared by the applicable competition law systems. In this context, Elhauge 
and Geradin153 have noted that there is a ³global problem that the most aggressive antitrust 
regime always wins. [...] To the extent that EU law is generally more restrictive than US law, 
it means largely ceding to the EU the antitrust reguODWLRQRIJOREDOPDUNHWV´154 However, it is 
difficult to see how EU competition law may regulate the global markets in so far as public 
enforcers across Europe are unlikely to have the resources to investigate all the complaints they 
receive.155 In other words, there may not be overregulation, but on the contrary there may be a 
strong case that there is an enforcement gap at present.156  
 
1. Remedies for breach of Competition Laws: a level of divergence 
It is necessary to consider whether the various remedies for breach of competition law provide 
for an effective enforcement regime in a global context.157Microsoft158 does suggest that even 
when the competition authorities in the various countries agree as to the anti-competitive 
character of the behaviour, there may be a level of divergence when it comes to the appropriate 
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remedies which should be deployed.159 In this case, Microsoft was found to infringe Article 102 
TFEU by refusing to supply the complete and accurate specifications to some of its competitors 
as well as by making the availability of the Microsoft Windows operating system on the 
simultaneous acquisition of Windows Media Player.160 However, the European Union approach 
and the remedies imposed were criticised by the US authorities161 and commentators.162  
Similarly, the EU policy makers have expressed a disapproving attitude towards some of 
the remedies deployed by the US legislator. For example, it is well established that a US award 
of multiple damages would infringe the UK Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, which 
may therefore affect the availability of such damages in England.163 As noted elsewhere,164 the 
prevailing opinion165 is that an English court should refuse to multiply the sum assessed as 
compensation on the ground that multiple damages would be contrary to its public policy. But 
why should an English court not consider the legitimate interests of a foreign competition law 
system awarding treble damages, if the relevant anti-competitive conduct is significantly 
foreign?166  
There are good reasons suggesting that a new mode of governance, incorporating a private 
international law solution, which provides for co-ordination of the various competition law 
systems, would be needed. Such a global instrument could allow a court to factor in the fact 
that a foreign competition law system, which has legitimate interests in regulating the business 
activities in question, had decided that multiple damages are an appropriate and effective 
remedy for breach of its competition laws. In particular, if the US legislature had decided that 
the probability of detection of an illegal cartel is 33 per cent and as a result any compensatory 
award should be tripled to provide an effective remedy for certain competition law 
infringements,167 then this very remedy should be awarded in an appropriate case, for example, 
by an English court.168 In other words, such a new global PIL mechanism would take account 
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of fact that the  foreign competition law system has legitimate interest to decide how best to 
enforce its own antitrust laws in a case, in which the anti-competitive conduct took place in its 
territory, causing anti-competitive harm there.169 A more flexible PIL solution would 
undoubtedly reflect the fact that exemplary damages may be seen as an appropriate and 
effective remedy in some competition cases.170 This was acknowledged by the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal in Cardiff City Transport171 where it was KHOGWKDW³H[HPSODU\GDPDJHVFDQ
in theory be awarded where there is an intentional breach of the law i.e. the defendant acts 
knowing that what he does constitutes an infringement of competition law and intending that 
infringement´.172 These examples may be regarded as a strong indication that an appropriate 
private international law mode of governance, which allows for another country¶VFRPSHWLWLRQ
laws to be applied in cases where the country in question has legitimate interests to have its 
competition laws applicable, might need to be considered by the policy-makers in a global 
context.  
  
2. Conditions for bringing competition law actions: a level of divergence 
The case for a global regime may be strengthened if one considers the level of divergence 
between conditions for bringing competition law actions. A recent study173 shows the 
FRQGLWLRQVIRUEULQJLQJDQWLWUXVWFODLPVGRLQIOXHQFHOLWLJDQWV¶WDFWLFVeven in Europe where EU 
competition law forms SDUWRIHDFK0HPEHU6WDWH¶VOHJDORUGer. A case for harmonisation was 
made by a recently adopted Directive on antitrust damages actions.174  
But, how to address the problems in a global context? Is there even more variation 
globally? The passing-on defence and standing are addressed by the European Commission in 
its proposed Directive as well as by the Supreme Court of Canada in Pro-Sys Consultants v 
Microsoft Corporation.175 EU Directive 2014/104 states that ³Member States shall ensure that 
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the defendant in an action for damages can invoke as a defence against a claim for damages the 
fact that the claimant passed on the whole or part of the overcharge resulting from the 
infringement of competition law´176 As a matter of EU law, anyone who has suffered harm 
caused by a competition law infringement has the right to EH³DEOH WRFODLPDQGREWDLQIXOO
compensation for that harm.´177  Thus, an indirect purchaser178 may seek compensation for 
losses suffered from the anti-competitive conduct179 or to enjoin future anti-competitive 
conduct.180  
On the contrary, the passing-on defence cannot be invoked by defendants in the US.181 
Moreover, the US Supreme Court in Illinois Brick v Illinois182 held that: 
³>«@following an automatic recovery of the full overcharge by the direct purchaser, the indirect 
purchaser could sue to recover the same amount. The risk of duplicative recoveries created by 
unequal application of the Hanover Shoe rule is much more substantial than in the more usual 
situation where the defendant is sued in two different lawsuits by plaintiffs asserting conflicting 
claims to the same fund. A one-sided application of Hanover Shoe substantially increases the 
possibility of inconsistent adjudications -- and therefore of unwarranted multiple liability for the 
defendant -- by presuming that one plaintiff (the direct purchaser) is entitled to full recovery 
while preventing the defendant from using that presumption against the other plaintiff; 
overlapping recoveries are certain to result from the two lawsuits unless the indirect purchaser is 
unable to establish any pass-on whatsoever. As in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U. S. 
251, 405 U. S. 264 (1972), we are unwilling to µopen the door to duplicative reFRYHULHV¶ >«@´183 
 
Recently the Canadian Supreme Court had a chance to opine on this, and went on to hold 
WKDWWKHUHMHFWLRQRIWKHSDVVLQJRQGHIHQFHGRHVQRWSUHFOXGHWKHLQGLUHFWSXUFKDVHUV¶DFWLRQV184 
This example clearly suggests that, despite the similarities/distinctions between the various 
competition law systems, the questions of double and multiple recoveries may well be 
addressed in a global context through a private international law tool used as a new mode of 
governance. 
Collective redress mechanisms may be seen as yet another area which suggests that, 
despite the remaining differences, the trend is for the regimes to become more similar than they 
used to be in the past. It should be noted that class actions on an opt-out basis185 have been 
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known for some time in the United States.186 Although, the recent Commission 
Recommendation states that the µRSW-LQ¶ SULQFLSOH ZRXOG GRPLQDWH LQ (XURSH LW JRHV RQ WR
indicate that there may be exceptions which may be justified by reasons of sound administration 
of justice.187 In competition law cases, the need for making such an exception appears to be 
regarded as justifiable by the UK government in the recently adopted Consumer Right Act 
2015. In particular WKH 8. JRYHUQPHQW ³GHFLGHG WR LQWURGXFH a limited opt-out collective 
actions regime, with safeguards, for competition law, with cases to be heard only in the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal´188 Although there appear to be differences between the US 
regime and the EU proposed model, Justice Kagan,189 sitting at the US Supreme Court, appears 
to present an interesting WUHQGIURPWKH86E\VWDWLQJ³7KH&RXUWWRGD\PLVWDNHVZKDWWKLV
case is about. To a hammer, everything looks like a nail. And to a Court bent on diminishing 
WKHXVHIXOQHVVRI5XOHHYHU\WKLQJORRNVOLNHDFODVVDFWLRQUHDG\WREHGLVPDQWOHG´190  
In view of the foregoing, one may say that the time is ripe for the international community 
to set out rules which co-ordinate cross-border competition law proceedings initiated in a global 
context. Transportation Surcharge Antitrust Litigation191 may be regarded as a good example 
as to how a non-EU court could award compensatory damages to UK consumers for damages 
they have suffered as a result of a cross-border competition infringement. This case re-iterates 
the important role which the private international law rules could play for claimants (and their 
representatives) who wish to obtain redress in a global context.   
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E. THE WAY FORWARD: A PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW TOOL AS A NEW MODE OF 
GOVERNANCE 
The foregoing examples suggest that there is a strong case for the issues of competence 
allocation and applicable competition laws (which may apply with respect to the same cross-
border business activities performed in a global context) to be addressed head-on by policy-
makers in a global context. A private international law mechanism may be particularly 
important to this end.  
According WR SULYDWH LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ WKHRU\ ³>L@W LV SRVVLEOH WR VHHN D µKDUPRQ\ RI
ODZV¶ µXQLVRQ RI GHFLVLRQV¶ RU D µPLQLPXP RI FRQIOLFWLQJ GHFLVLRQV¶ >«@ HLWKHU WKURXJK
limitations upon tKH DVVXPSWLRQ RI DGMXGLFDWRU\ MXULVGLFWLRQ RU WKURXJK FKRLFH RI ODZ´192 
Parallel proceedings may be avoided if there is a special basis for jurisdiction which requires a 
substantial connection with the forum in antitrust law claims.193 The problem with this solution 
is that competition law claims often involve multiple injured parties as harm may be caused in 
a number of countries. The analysis of Mr Justice Teare in Cooper Tire appears to suggest that 
in many competition law cases, the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred 
may be very difficult indeed to determine.194  
The issues could be even more complex with regard to anti-competitive activities which 
are global in nature. A need for taking evidence in one country in support of proceedings in 
another country may often arise in competition cases. Von Mehren and Trautman195 have noted 
WKDW³DGMXGLFDWRU\DFWLRQRIRQHMXULVGLFWLRQLILWLVWREHIXOO\HIIHFWLYHZLOORIWHQUHTXLUHWKH
cooperation of other jurisdictions.´196 The rules designed to deal with the parallel proceedings 
would be particularly important in this context. The European Union regime is based on the 
assumption that the court first seised is always more appropriate.197 However, it may often be 
the case that the court first seised is not well placed to hear and determine a competition law 
dispute because, for example, an anti-competitive agreement, which has been implemented in 
a number of countries, does not affect the market in the jurisdiction where the action is brought. 
As noted elsewhere,198 a more satisfactory result could be reached if the courts were entitled to 
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decline jurisdiction (or transfer the proceedings199) in cases where agreement or practice has no 
substantial direct (actual or foreseeable) effects on competition within the jurisdiction.200 The 
DGYDQWDJHVRIDQDSSURDFKZKLFKOLQNVWKHFRXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQZLWKWKHHIIHFWVRQFRPSHWLWLRQ
ZLWKLQ D FRXQWU\¶V WHUULWRU\ as well as with the applicable competition laws could be 
demonstrated by the US Supreme Court ruling in the Empagran case.201  
Another important issue, which is to be considered when devising a global competition 
law regime based on co-operation between the various competition law systems relates to the 
TXHVWLRQ ³whether and how choice-of-law practices should be taken into account in the 
IRUPXODWLRQRIUXOHVJRYHUQLQJWKHDVVXPSWLRQRIDGMXGLFDWRU\MXULVGLFWLRQ´202 Given the public 
policy character of most competition law provisions (and their mandatory nature in particular), 
the traditional privatH LQWHUQDWLRQDO WKHRULHV ZKLFK SUHVXSSRVH ³WKH VHOHFWLRQ RI D VLQJOH
JRYHUQLQJODZIRUUHVROXWLRQRIPXOWLVWDWHGLVSXWHV´203 may not produce satisfactory results in 
cases where there are competition law infringements which are often global in nature. In such 
FDVHVWKHSUREOHPVPD\EHGHDOWZLWKE\³recourse to special substantive rules which would 
seek to adjust, on a basis of equality, the views of all legitimately concerned jurisdictions.´204 
As von Mehren notes ³The multi-state rule proposed, unlike a domestic-rule solution, thus 
recognizes that [several] VWDWHV KDYH OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVWV LQ WKH VLWXDWLRQ´205 Could this 
theoretical model be developed and used in global competition law cases?  
The advantages of adopting such an approach with regard to global business activities 
can be demonstrated by the following example (ZKLFKLVPRGHOOHGRQYRQ0HKUHQ¶VDQDO\VLV 
of choice of law theories206). Suppose that a loyalty discount is permissible in State A, but 
prohibited in State B.207 On the one hand, if the laws of State A are applied, then the prohibitive 
effect of the laws of State B would be defeated. On the other hand, if the laws of State B are 
applied, then the business practice would be regarded as prohibited. However, it may be 
problematic for a national court to apply the laws of State A and prohibit a conduct, which State 
B regards as legitimaWH LQ VR IDU DV ³LWV SURFRPSHWLWLYH FRQVequences likely outweigh its 
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DQWLFRPSHWLWLYHHIIHFWV´208 Since different outcomes may be reached depending on what is the 
applicable substantive law, a more appropriate solution would be to ³apply ERWKVWDWHV¶UXOHV
FRPSURPLVLQJGLIIHUHQFHVRQWKHEDVLVRIWKHUHODWLYHVWUHQJWKRIHDFKOHJDORUGHU¶VFODLPWR
UHJXODWH´209 Another example may relate to export cartels. Such cartels, which may not be 
regarded as illegal in State A (i.e. the exporting nation), may adversely affect the trade in State 
B (i.e. the importing nation). Given the legitimate interests of the importing nation, the laws of 
State B may well have a stronger claim to regulate and apply in this context, and as a result they 
should be applied irrespective of whether the dispute is litigated. Therefore, there is a very 
strong case for discussion in a global context with a view to setting out the specific detail of a 
private international law tool which may be used to co-ordinate the cross-border enforcement 
activities in a global context.  
On the one hand, a less ambitious private international law solution may be adopted under 
the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. Following the failure of 
the Hague Conference Draft Convention on jurisdiction and foreign judgments in civil and 
commercial matters,210 the Global Judgments project was restarted.211 Although the interim text 
of the Judgments Convention212 (and recently adopted Choice of Court Agreement 
Convention213) excluded competition claims from the scope of the Convention, there is a strong 
case for the inclusion of the antitrust/competition claims into a newly proposed Judgments 
Convention.214 It seems that, given the previous experience with a Global Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Convention, the Hague Conference project will proceed as a ³single´215 convention 
ZKLFKZLOOLQFOXGHVRPH³MXULVGLFWLRQDOILOWHUV´216 This may be seen as an opportunity for the 
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international community to ensure the recognition and enforcement of judgments in relation to 
competition law claims, indirectly dealing with issues of jurisdiction and parallel proceedings 
as well as with the issue of a conflict of competition laws while taking their public policy 
character into account. 
On the other hand, the prevailing view appears to be that it would be very difficult (if not 
impossible) to agree (directly or indirectly) at The Hague Conference on a global rule on 
jurisdiction for competition law cases. Due to political dimension of jurisdiction,217 the States 
around the globe may be very careful when negotiating jurisdictional rules which are to allocate 
jurisdiction in antitrust cases. In view of that, one may argue that D ³PXOWLOHYHO µMXGLFLDO 
JRYHUQDQFH¶´218 of competition law enforcement activities in a global context may be best 
discussed and achieved under the auspices of the OECD which is well aware of the ³complexity 
of cross-border competition law enforcement co-operation´.219  
The OECD may take a lead in proposing and negotiating a multi-lateral agreement which 
may be used as a new form of cooperation with a view to co-ordinating cross-border antitrust 
enforcement activities in a global context. To this end, a private international law tool may be 
used to allocate jurisdiction in competition law cases as well as to promote the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments, whilst encouraging a closer co-operation of the competition 
authorities in the ICN framework.220 
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